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I. INTRODUCTION
Judge Learned Hand once remarked, "As a litigant, I should dread a
lawsuit beyond almost anything short of sickness and death."' Business
executives understand Judge Hand's reasoning. A lawsuit can cost a
great deal of money to litigate. More than just money, however, can be
lost by litigation. The time which a corporate officer must expend on
details of the litigation is time which cannot be used to improve produc-
tivity or compete more effectively. Additionally, the attendant publicity
associated with a lawsuit may adversely affect the corporate image. This
situation may be especially true if the other party is able, through distor-
tion in the media, to publicly portray the business as an aggressor-even
if the court determines that the business was the victim. Consequently,
businesses are frequently prepared to settle aniy potential litigation
through formal or informal methods of dispute resolution. They are also
prepared to preclude even the possibility of litigation. As a result, liqui-
dated damage clause' are often included when commercial parties nego-
tiate contracts.
Liquidated damage clauses are agreements by which contractual par-
ties stipulate a specified level of damages to be awarded in the event that
the contract is breached.2 These clauses are promulgated by the parties
when the contract is formed.3 They appear to be an efficient means to
preclude litigation or to resolve conflict if a dispute arises. Yet, several
significant issues concerning the extent, or even wisdom of enforcing liq-
uidated damage agreements exist under the present state of Ohio law.
When examining the use of liquidated damage agreements, a com-
monly held view is that two parties who have agreed to a contract should
be held to its terms. Indeed, that is a general rule of law.4 However, in
Ohio, that rule is not applicable to liquidated damages. In order for liq-
uidated damage agreements to be enforced, the clause must meet a very
narrowly drawn set of guidelines. 5 Furthermore, there is reason to ques-
tion whether liquidated damages should be enforceable in certain cir-
cumstances. For example, there is an implicit assumption that the con-
1. J. HENRY & 3. LIEBERMAN, THE MANAGER'S GUIDE To RESOLVING LEGAL DISPUTES
(1985).
2. 30 0. JUR. 3D Damages § 127 (1981).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.92(A) (Anderson 1979).
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tracting parties have an equivalent level of bargaining power. That,
unfortunately, is not always the case. A significant policy issue exists as
to the wisdom of enforcing contractual settlements in the event that one
party held significant leverage over another party during contract negoti-
ation. In such situations, the weaker party would not only be denied its
right to damages, but also its right to litigate. Effective dispute resolu-
tion methods should provide justice without litigation, not give the pow-
erful a greater advantage.
The other side of this argument, however, is the need for certainty.
Liquidated damage agreements are useful to commercial parties be-
cause, from the beginning of a contractual relationship, they preclude
the possibility of litigation. Consequently, unlike the circumstances sur-
rounding settlement negotiations, the passions of the parties are not in-
flamed. Rather, the parties have rationally determined what the level of
damages should be in the event of a breach. If the courts refuse to con-
sistently enforce these agreements, the advantages of liquidated damages
are lost. When a party feels wronged, he may desire to litigate if he feels
that any chance of winning exists. This desire to litigate may be present
even if compensation has been previously agreed to in a liquidated dam-
age clause. Should the judiciary, through its decisions, send mixed sig-
nAls concerning the enforceability of such clauses, it is highly probable
that many parties will test the validity of the liquidated damage clauses
iq court. Thus, liquidated damage clauses will have lost most of their
value because the dispute was eventually litigated.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the effectiveness of liquidated
damage clauses as tools of dispute resolution under Ohio law. It will be-
gin with a discussion of Ohio law as it exists today. The Note will pre-
sqnt some common situations in which liquidated damage clauses are
used and then examine some of the issues concerning these uses. Next, it
will compare the liquidated damages to two of the more common meth-
ods of resolving business disputes-settlement agreements and binding
arbitration. Finally, the conclusion will provide guidelines for the use of
liquidated damage clauses in the current commercial environment and
give suggestions for the improvement of current Ohio law.
II. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES-CURRENT LAW IN OHIO
Liquidated damage law in Ohio is governed by a statute which is
based on the Uniform Commercial Code. The statute establishes several
conditions which must exist before any liquidated damage clause will be
enforced by a court. First, the actual amount of damages must be uncer-
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tain and difficult to prove.6 Second, the amount of damages stipulated by
the clause must not be unreasonable or unconscionable.7 Finally, the con-
tracting parties must have intended that the liquidated damages be
awarded in the event of a breach.' If the damages awarded by-the clause
do not meet these conditions, then an Ohio court will consider such an
award to be a penalty and will refuse to enforce it.9 A recent case de-
cided by the Ohio Supreme Court serves to illustrate how the current
law is applied.
In the case of Samson Sales v. Honeywell, the plaintiff, Samson Sales,
owned a pawn shop. The plaintiff entered into a contract with Morse
Signal Devices by which Morse agreed to install and maintain a burglar
alarm system. Morse was eventually taken over by the defendant, Hon-
eywell, Inc., which assumed responsibility for the contract. Subsequent
to Honeywell's takeover, Samson Sales was robbed. Honeywell, however,
negligently failed to notify police of the break-in, as was required by the
terms of the contract. 10 As a result of the robbery, Samson Sales lost a
total of $68,303 in merchandise. Samson Sales sued, but Honeywell de-
fended itself by reason of a liquidated damage clause in the contract.
That clause, written in fine print, limited Honeywell's liability to a sum
of only fifty dollars."
The Supreme Court determined that none of the requisite conditions
for enforcing liquidated damage clauses were present in this case.1 2 The
court noted that damages could be precisely determined. 3 Moreover, the
court stated that $50, in view of the considerable loss, was an uncon-
scionable sum which would act as a penalty if enforced. 4 Finally, the
court stated that the liquidated damage clause did not reflect the inten-
tion of the parties. In reaching this final element of the decision, the
court placed special emphasis on the fact that the liquidated damage
clause was typed in small print. Furthermore, the court noted that the
clause seemed to conflict with another contractual obligation of Honey-
well which required it to notify the police in the event of a robbery.' 5 As
a result, the court voided the liquidated damage clause."6
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. See Samson Sales v. Honeywell, 12 Ohio St. 3d 27, 465 N.E.2d 392 (1984). See
also 30 0. JUR. 3D, supra note 2, at § 127.
10. Samson Sales v. Honeywell, 12 Ohio St. 3d 27, 27, 465 N.E.2d 392, 393 (1984).
11. Id., 465 N.E.2d at 393.
12. Id. at 29, 465 N.E.2d at 394.
13. Id., 465 N.E.2d at 394.
14. Id., 465 N.E.2d at 394.
15. Id., 465 N.E.2d at 394.
16. Id., 465 N.E.2d at 394.
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In comparison, Ohio's courts do not hesitate to enforce valid liquidated
damage agreements. They have, for example, refused to set aside valid
agreements in spite of the fact that greater damages than those stipu-
lated have been incurred. a In order to obtain greater damages than
those granted by a valid liquidated damage clause, the clause itself must
contain a provision which allows for litigation in order to receive greater
damages."8 Although liquidation damage agreements appear to be an ex-
pedient method of dispute resolution, a number of problems mitigate
against their use.
III. PRACTICAL PROGLEMS WITH LIQUIDATED DAMAGE LAW
Liquidated damage clauses are used in a variety of commercial set-
tings, from million dollar transactions to parking lot claim checks. De-
spite their seeming simplicity and efficiency, a number of problems cur-
rently inhibit their effectiveness. While liquidated damage law may
appear straightforward, the contracting parties are usually not familiar
with all of its ramifications. Consequently, when a court is called upon to
settle a dispute concerning a liquidated damage clause, an injustice may
result. This unfair consequence, in turn, raises policy issues concerning
the circumstances in which liquidated damage agreements should be en-
forced. In order to fully understand the impact of liquidated damage
clauses these problems and policy issues must now be examined.
The following is a hypothetical situation that examines the potential
issues that arise. Assume that Royal Apartments negotiates a lease with
Mr. Pleasant. Royal Apartments rents mostly to retirees who do not like
loud noise. It is highly probable that if some tenants create loud noise,
many of the retiree tenants will move out of the Royal Apartments.
Royal Apartments, consequently, would be damaged economically. Be-
cause motorcycles make a great deal of noise, Royal Apartments forbids
motorcycles on its premises. In its contract with Mr. Pleasant, a young
person, Royal Apartments includes a liquidated damage clause by which
Mr. Pleasant agrees to pay Royal Apartments fifty dollars each day he
brings a motorcycle on its premises.
In the abstract, this pre-dispute settlement agreement seems reasona-
ble. It also seems to fit the criteria for liquidated damage agreements.
First, the level of damages seems difficult to ascertain. For example,
while some tenants may specifically tell the management that they are
moving because of motorcycle noise, others may not renew their lease for
17. 30 0. JUR. 3D, supra note 2, at § 146.
18. Id. at § 145.
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a number of factors, of which motorcycle noise is one. Second, although
the liquidated damage level is high, it is not unreasonable in view of the
cost of rent and the potential loss for Royal Apartments. Finally, there
should be no dispute that this clause was not the intent of the con-
tracting parties. Both parties apparently had relatively equal bargaining
power since Mr. Pleasant could rent elsewhere. Additionally, this clause
does not conflict with any duties normally associated with either lessee or
lessor. In applying the law to a similar situation, however, the Ohio
Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County reached a different result.
In Berlinger v. Suburban Apartments, 9 the court decided in favor of
the tenant. The court conceded that actual damages resulting from a
breach of the "no-motorcycle" ban would be difficult to prove, but stated
that the amount was unreasonable.20 (The court never addressed the in-
tent provision, the third part of the liquidated damage test.) The court
based its decision to not enforce the liquidated damage clause on the fact
that the tenant was never seen or heard operating the motorcycle on the
Apartments' premises. Rather, the motorcycle was only seen parked. The
court conceded that damages might result from the operation of a motor-
cycle, but because no evidence had been introduced to demonstrate that
the mere presence of a motorcycle had caused damages, the court ruled
the liquidated damage clause invalid.21
The court's reasoning, in this case, is circular and prevents a legiti-
mate tool of dispute resolution from being used. First, the distinction
between "presence" and "operation" of a motorcycle is extremely thin.
Few people "walk" their motorcycles for any distance in order to park
them. Additionally, the court's requirement for evidence of damages
begs the question. A valid liquidated damage clause requires that dam-
ages be difficult to ascertain. If the apartment complex could have
demonstrated "[the amount of damages which might foreseeably result
from the mere presence of a motorcycle,"22 it would not have had to rely
on a liquidated damage clause to be compensated. Indeed, such a clause
would have been void under Ohio law.23
The court's decision is regrettable for yet another reason. It decreases
the amount of certainty that the agreed-upon liquidated damage clause
will be enforced in court. As previously explained, the elements of this
case appeared to reasonably follow the guidelines established by Ohio
19. Berlinger v. Suburban Apartment Management Co., 7 Ohio App. 3d 122, 454
N.E.2d 1367 (1982).
20. Id. at 124, 454 N.E.2d at 1371.
21. Id. at 124-25, 454 N.E.2d at 1371.
22. Id. aL 124, 454 N.E.2d 1371.
23. OHIo REv. CoDE ANN. § 1302.92.
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law. The court, however, voided the liquidated damage clause. In con-
trast, if the same damages had been agreed to in a valid settlement
agreement24 or validly awarded by an arbitrator (if the parties had
agreed to arbitration), 25 the court would have enforced the agreement.
Certainly, if the Apartment Company had proven damages during litiga-
tion, it would have been awarded those damages.
The Berlinger case has introduced confusion into the law as to what
constitutes "reasonableness" in liquidated damage agreements. As a re-
sult, attorneys representing clients adversely affected by such agree-
ments, are able to tell their clients that a reasonable chance for avoiding
the agreement may exist. Consequently, litigation to test the validity of
such agreements is more likely to ensue. Therefore, one of the principal
reasons for using liquidated damage clauses, the avoidance of litigation,
is lost. Since the use of liquidated damage clauses no longer offers signif-
icant protection from litigation, businesspeople may be less inclined to
use them. As a result, other forms of resolving conflict, including litiga-
tion, are encouraged.
The non-enforcement of some liquidated damage clauses can create a
njimber of problems. However, in other circumstances, their enforcement
can also serve to inhibit the use of liquidated damage clauses as a tool of
dispute resolution. The hypothetical can illustrate this point. Assume
now that Royal Apartments has a contract with King Laundry Company
tq operate Royal Apartment's laundry room. The contract contains a liq-
uidated damage clause by which, if Royal Apartments breaches the con-
tract, it agrees to pay King Laundry damages equal to the amount of
money which King Laundry earned from Royal Apartments in the previ-
ous month times the number of months remaining on the contract. The
contract has eighteen months to run until it expires.
This liquidated damage clause again appears to be reasonable. The
actual damages are uncertain, the liquidated damages reasonable, and
the clause accurately reflects the "intent" of the parties. Furthermore,
the parties seem to have equal bargaining power. In this situation
though, a new twist occurs. Joker Laundry Company tortiously interferes
with King Laundry's business by inducing Royal Apartment to breach
its contract with King Laundry.
While some may argue that no significant problem exists because, if
the liquidated damage clause is valid, King Laundry will be adequately
compensated, it should be underscored that Joker Laundry committed a
tort. Tortfeasors are liable not only for compensatory, but also for puni-
24. See, e.g., 15 0. JUR. 3D Compromise, Accord and Release § 13 (1979).
25. See, e.g.. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2711.10 - 2711.11.
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tive damages. In the present set of circumstances, however, Ohio law
would apparently allow Joker Laundry to escape unpunished.
The case of Davison Fuel & Dock Co. v. Pickands Mather & Co.2"
involved a similar situation. In that case, a dispute arose among a coal
supplier, a coal delivery company and the ultimate purchaser of the coal.
The dispute included many of the same issues contained in the Royal
Apartments' example, but did not include a claim based upon a liqui-
dated damage clause. Nevertheless, this case is important to the present
discussion because of the decision made by the Court of Appeals for
Hamilton County. The Court of Appeals stated that a party may main-
tain a cause of action against the party who breached the contract, the
party who tortiously induced the breach, or both.17 However, if the com-
plaining party has fully recovered damages from the breaching party,
then it cannot recover additional damages from the tortfeasor.2 8 Further-
more, under Ohio law, no punitive damages can be recovered from a
tortfeasor if no compensatory damages have been recovered from the al-
leged tortfeasor2 9
Applying this reasoning to the hypothetical situation, it would appear
that Joker Laundry would not be liable for any damages. The liquidated
damage clause between Royal Apartments and King Laundry was valid.
Additionally, if a liquidated damage clause is valid, Ohio's courts will
only enforce the damages stipulated in the liquidated damage clause.
Thus, King Laundry will have been fully compensated by its liquidated
damage clause with Royal Apartments. Because it was fully compen-
sated by Royal, King can seek neither compensatory damages nor puni-
tive damages from Joker.
Admittedly, the situation in Davison did not involve a liquidated dam-
age clause.3" Moreover, in view of the propensity of courts to declare
liquidated damages to be penalties, 1 it is not inconceivable that a court
would conclude that this situation worked a "constructive" penalty
against King Laundry. However, a high degree of doubt is created by the
existing legal situation and, in fact, a California court decided a factu-
ally similar case in a similar manner. 32 As a result, comparing liquidated
26. Davison Fuel & Dock Co. v. Pickands Mather & Co., 54 Ohio App. 2d 177, 376
N.E.2d 965 (1977).
27. Id. at 181-82, 376 N.E.2d at 968.
28. Id. at 182, 376 N.E.2d at 968.
29. Id. at 180-81, 376 N.E.2d at 967.
30. Id. at 177-85, 376 N.E.2d at 966-67.
31. 30 0. JUR. 3D, supra note 2, at § 128.
32. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Morse Signal Devices, 151 Cal. App. 3d 681, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 756 (1984).
In that case, Fireman's Fund was the insurance company for several businesses who had
contracted for alarm services from Morse Signal. Each of the insured businesses had suf-
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damages to other methods of resolving disputes once again places them
in a less advantageous position.
If King Laundry had negotiated a settlement for the contract breach
and business tort, it would have had very substantial leverage against
Joker Laundry, and conceivably could have easily extracted some dam-
ages from Joker. The use of arbitration would also have likely resulted in
Joker paying damages to King Laundry. If it had not required Joker to
pay damages to King Laundry, the arbitration settlement may have been
vacated by a court. If King Laundry had litigated the matter, he would
have had a very good chance of obtaining damages. In any event, either
negotiated settlement or arbitration would have provided a more accept-
able and just solution than the enforcement of the liquidated damage
clause.
Although some circumstances discourage the use of liquidated damage
agreements, other situations may provide an incentive for their use, even
if a manifest injustice occurs. In order to illustrate this point, return to
the Royal Apartment's hypothetical situation. As a result of the previous
problems with liquidated damage clauses, the owner of Royal Apart-
ments has fired his old manager and is now in need of a new manager.
Ms. Princess, a recent MBA graduate, applies for the job and is given an
offer. In the employment contract, a covenant not to compete within the
metropolitan area for a period of three years after termination of the
employment contract is included. The contract also contains a liquidated
damage clause which states that if the covenant not to compete is vio-
lated, Princess will be liable to Royal Apartments for $5,000 in damages.
Princess' annual salary will be $32,000 and termination can be for any
reason. Although Princess has an MBA, her choices are not unlimited.
fered from theft or fire and, in each instance, the alarm system failed to properly notify the
responsible authorities. Fireman's Fund, as the insurer, sued Morse Signal for a variety of
claims. It also sought to invalidate the liquidated damage clauses in the contracts between
Morse Signal and the insured businesses.
The court, however, upheld the liquidated damage clauses. The court stated that, al-
though the liquidated damage clauses would be invalidated in the event of gross negligence,
Fireman's Fund's complaint only alleged simple negligence. The court also stated that no
claim was made that Morse Signal owed any duty to the insured businesses outside of the
contractual relationship and that "[N]o breach of duty was alleged other than a failure to
render the contracted for services." Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Morse Signal Devices, 151
Cal. App. 3d 681, 691, 198 Cal. Rptr. 756, 762.
Undoubtedly, the tort situation in the hypothetical example is more direct and could
possibly meet the California guidelines for invalidating liquidated damage clauses. Never-
theless, its uncertain outcome, as well as the dubious result in Fireman's Fund, indicates
that this is an area which is in need of attention if liquidated damage clauses are to become
more useful as a dispute resolution tool.
See also 22 AM. JUR. 2 D Damages § 689 (1988).
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Furthermore, most employers in Ohio have some form of a covenant not
to compete. Consequently, Princess decides to accept the offer.
A year passes and now Junior, the son of Royal's owner, graduates
from the local business college with an MBA. In order to keep the busi-
ness completely in family hands, the owner terminates Ms. Princess' em-
ployment. A competing apartment complex, however, has witnessed
Princess' extraordinary management ability and subsequently hires her.
Unfortunately, Princess will be required to pay Royal Apartments the
liquidated damages stipulated in the original employment contract.
Under Ohio law, covenants not to compete are valid provided they are
not unconscionable."3 Ohio's courts have even enforced these covenants
when, as in Princess' case, the employee has been terminated. 34 Addi-
tionally, Ohio's judiciary has upheld the use of liquidated damage
clauses in enforcing non-competition covenants35 because, "[a]mong the
many contracts where the amount of damages suffered by the breach
thereof will be almost impossible to prove are contracts where one of the
parties agrees not to engage in a particular kind of business or profes-
sion. .... 31 Consequently, it must be concluded that Ohio's courts will
enforce liquidated damage clauses that affect covenants not to compete
even when the employee has been terminated. That outcome, however, is
not fair and is not in the interests of encouraging dispute resolution.
One of the goals of dispute resolution should be to provide a fair and
equitable settlement or hearing for any grievance. When liquidated dam-
age clauses are applied to non-competition agreements, however, an equi-
table settlement is often precluded because the respective contracting
parties were in unequal bargaining positions when the employment con-
tract was negotiated. In the hypothetical situation between Royal Apart-
ments and Ms. Princess, Ms. Princess was in a clearly inferior bargain-
ing position. She had no real power to negotiate any of the terms
33. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.10.
34. See, e.g.. Raimonds v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St. 2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544 (1975).
35. Id., 325 N.E.2d 544.
36. See, e.g., Lange v. Werk, 2 Ohio St. 519 (1853). See also 30 0. JUR. 3D, supra note
2, at § 144.
It is interesting to note that various states treat liquidated damage agreements in non-
competition agreements differently. Most states, including Ohio, uphold such agreements if
they are reasonable. Pennsylvania and Michigan courts, however, have invalidated such
provisions as being penalties. Massachusetts has taken the view that such agreements are
neither liquidated damages nor penalties, but a contractual price for engaging in a compet-
itive business. The Supreme Court of Louisiana, on the other hand, has refused to enforce
such liquidated damage agreements because of a state law prohibiting noncompetition
agreements. For further reading about this issue, see 22 AM. JtR. 2D, supra note 32, at §
720.
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affecting her employment contract. The non-competition agreement and
associated liquidated damage clause were virtually forced upon her.
Normally, when examining liquidated damage clauses, Ohio's courts
are very sensitive to this unequal relationship because it is an indication
of the intention of the contracting parties to accept any liquidated dam-
age clause. 7 This standard, however, has not proven very persuasive in
judicial decisions affecting non-competition agreements.38
This is not to suggest that Ohio's courts would uphold any liquidated
damage clause which was supported by an unconscionable agreement not
to compete.39 Nor does it suggest that Ohio's courts would enforce a
clearly unreasonable liquidated damage claim. However, it appears that
Ohio courts have not been as sensitive as they should be to issues involv-
ing unequal bargaining positions and liquidated damage clauses. Fur-
thermore, a fundamental question of fairness must be raised when courts
enforce liquidated damage clauses as a means of settling disputes be-
tween employers and employees.
In addition to being unfair, the use of liquidated damage clauses to
enforce covenants not to compete or to settle disputes between employers
and employees harms the cause of dispute resolution. Courts are viewed
as guarantors of justice. Consequently, when people feel wronged, they
turn to the justice system to seek redress. When courts enforce out-of-
court settlements which are viewed as "unfair", people naturally tend to
reject the idea and use of out-of-court settlements. As a result, the
amount of litigation increases and methods of dispute resolution are
eschewed. 40
It is undisputed that, in the Ms. Princess situation, every alternative
means of resolving the dispute would have awarded some measure of
damages to Royal Apartments. Covenants not to compete are legal in
Ohio. Therefore, a settlement agreement (if one could have been
reached), arbitration award, or resulting litigation would have favored
Royal Apartments. The difference, however, is that with a liquidated
damage clause, Princess did not have the opportunity to present her case.
At the time of her employment Ms. Princess was forced to decide be-
tween a job or an automatic waiver of her right to dispute damages.
That "forced" waiver and the lack of opportunity to present her side is
37. Hattersly v. Waterville, 4 0CC NS 242, 249, 26 OCC 226 (1904).
38. 30 0. JuR. 3D, supra note 2, at § 132.
39. Noncompetition agreements are frequently negotiated in the context of an employer-
employee relationship. As this article has previously stated, that relationship often involves
an unequitable bargaining position which forces the employee to choose between unemploy-
ment or the agreement. Since Ohio's judiciary has not invalidated these agreements, the
author feels that the statement concerning the courts' lack of sensitivity is justified.
40. See, e.g., 30 0. JuR. 3D, supra note 2, at §§ 145-46.
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why liquidated damage clauses, in the case of employer-employee dis-
putes, should not be enforced.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY GOALS-DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LIQUIDATED
DAMAGES
There are a number of problems -associated with the use of liquidated
damage agreements. In order for them to become a more acceptable
means of dispute resolution, some corrective action must be taken.
Before such action can be initiated, however, it is necessary to under-
stand society's general goals for dispute resolution. Once these public
policy goals are known, a comparison to liquidated damage law can be
made. Discrepancies can be identified and remedial action can be
suggested.
These general policy goals for dispute resolution will be identified in
the following section. It will then be demonstrated how certain aspects of
Ohio law support these policy goals. A comparison will then be made to
liquidated damage law. Although the list of goals is not intended to be
exhaustive, it will provide a general framework for analysis.
While courts may have a variety of motives for supporting alternative
methods of dispute resolution, a principal policy reason is the reduction
of the courts' workload.4 1 Throughout most of the nation, judges and
attorneys are generally overworked and long delays exist from the filing
of a complaint until its actual court date.42 Ohio law indicates a support
for this policy goal of reducing court congestion. For example, a settle-
ment of disputes is so favored that, after a settlement has been agreed
upon, a cause of action can only be maintained on the settlement and not
the original cause of action.43 Ohio has further supported this policy by
codifying an arbitration statute which enforces arbitration awards. 4 Liq-
uidated damage clauses also support this policy because they provide an
41. See generally Hensler, Court Annexed Arbitration, ADR AND THE COURTS: A
MANUAL FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS 40-41 (1987). It is implicit that dispute resolution
must be fair in order to be successful. If such a system is not fair, then at least one of the
parties will have reason not to opt for this procedure. In recognition of this fact, most
dispute resolution procedures have fairness as one of their goals. The dispute resolution
process, if structured correctly, seems to be accomplishing this objective. For example, in a
survey of participants to arbitration proceedings in Pittsburgh and Bucks County, Pennsyl-
vania, and Burlington County, New Jersey, researchers found a great deal of satisfaction
with the fairness of the process. This was true even of the litigants who lost their case.
42. Id. at 23.
43. 15 0. JUR. 3D, supra note 24, at § 13.
44. Otno REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.01.
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effective means of resolving disputes when properly drafted. The amount
of damages is fair and courts will enforce the agreement.
There is a general consensus that, in the absence of some type of
fraud, private settlements are a benign and effective method of reducing
the courts' workload. Some legal scholars disagree with this general rule.
Professor Morgan, of the University of Toronto, has produced a seminal
article examining the question of when contractual conflicts should be
allowed to be settled by dispute resolution and when these conflicts
should be adjudicated by a court."' Professor Morgan argues that com-
mon law contractual disputes are essentially private and involve individ-
ual rights. He believes those conflicts are ideally suited for dispute reso-
lution.46 On the other hand, conflicts which involve statutorily created
claims, such as allegations of antitrust violations, usually involve some
type of societal, as well as private, interest.4 7 Professor Mor ;an asserts
that these societal disputes should be settled only in the society's forum,
the court. 8 As a result, he is highly critical of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.'5
which enforced a contractual agreement to arbitrate disputes even
though the complaint contained allegations of antitrust activity.50 De-
spite the objections of Professor Morgan and like-minded individuals, the
practical result of the Supreme Court's ruling (as well as the staggering
increase in litigation) is that public policy will continue to support pri-
vate methods of dispute resolution for the foreseeable future.
A second policy objective for alternative methods of dispute resolution
is that the settlements awarded by these methods be granted the effect of
res judicata.5 1 The reasoning behind this policy is simple. If the awards
from such procedures were appealable, like normal court trials, then the
benefits of dispute resolution would be nullified.52 Ohio's legal procedures
45. Morgan, Contract Theory and the Sources of Rights: An Approach to the Arbi-
trability Question, 60 S. CAL. L. R~v. 1059 (1987).
46. Id. at 1069-75.
47. Id. at 1076-81.
48. Id.
49. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
50. Morgan, supra note 45, at 1076-80.
51. See generally Comment, The Res Judicata Standard of Confirmed Arbitration
Awards in Wisconsin, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 895. The Gilchrist article exposes a potential
conflict in the standard of res judicata which is applied to confirmed arbitration awards.
Apparently in Wisconsin there is confusion as to whether the civil-judicial or the arbitra-
tion standard should be used.
It is not the purpose of this article to explore the res judicata issue as thoroughly.
Rather, it intends merely to raise the issue as an important component of dispute
resolution.
52. See, e.g., City of Madison v. Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation, 20 Wis. 2d 361, 122
N.W.2d 409 (1963).
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have been generally supportive of this policy objective. As has been pre-
viously explained, settlement agreements 3 and arbitration awards" are
enforced by courts. Ohio's liquidated damage law is also supportive of
this policy. If the clause fulfills the statutory requirements, then the
court will only enforce the amount stipulated by the award.55
The third major policy goal for methods of dispute resolution is that
the process be fair.58 The judicial system applies the law and dispenses
justice. Any acceptable alternatives to the judicial system must accom-
plish these goals.5 7 In general, Ohio law concerning dispute settlements
establishes procedures for rescinding an unjust settlement. For example,
if a party can prove fraud or mutual mistake, then the courts will not
enforce a settlement agreement.58 Ohio's Arbitration Statute also mirrors
this concern for fairness. Section 2711.10 of the Ohio Revised Code
states the circumstances under which arbitration award may be vacated
in Ohio.59 Basically, an award may be vacated if corruption, fraud, mis-
conduct, or partiality is demonstrated.60 In that event, the court may, if
time to reach agreement has not expired, resubmit the matter to
arbitrators.61
While other methods of dispute resolution have been very supportive
of the "fairness" policy, liquidated damage clauses have had a mixed
record. On the one hand, courts will only enforce such clauses if the
amount stipulated is reasonable 2 and the parties intended that such a
sum be liquidated. 3 Otherwise, Ohio's courts will declare such "dam-
ages" as penalties and will not enforce them. On the other hand, Ohio's
courts have not closely examined the "intent" of parties when enforcing
non-competition agreements between employees and employers." Conse-
quently, liquidated damage clauses may appear to be unfair.
The final policy goal to be discussed is certainty of enforcement. This
goal is important because it serves to preclude litigation. When the con-
53. 15 0. JUR. 3D, supra note 2, at § 145.
54. OI-o REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.01.
55. 30 0. JUR. 3D, supra note 2, at § 145.
56. Hensler, supra note 41, at 32.
57. See, e.g., Hensler, supra note 41, at 32, 40-42.
58. 15 0. JUR.3D, supra note 24, at § 17.
59. Otno REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.10. See also Section 2711.01 for conflicts that are
precluded from arbitration.
60. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.10.
61. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1302.92.
62. Id.
63. Id.; see generally 30 0. JUR. 3D, supra note 2.
64. Because Ohio's courts have routinely enforced such agreements with much examina-
tion of the relative bargaining position of the employer and employee, the author feels this
statement is well taken. See, e.g., Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St. 2d 21, 325 N.E. 2d
544 (1975).
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flicting parties perceive that a challenge to an award, which has been
granted by a method of dispute resolution, will be defeated in court, then
they are much less likely to maintain litigation. In Ohio, settlement and
arbitration law supports this policy because both of these methods pro-
vide only a very narrow set of grounds by which an award can be va-
cated. 65 Liquidated damage clauses, however, pose a completely different
situation.
Liquidated damage clauses, by contrast, can be enforced under a very
narrow set of circumstances."6 Consequently, there are a large number of
circumstances under which they can be voided. For example, the
Berlinger case provided a situation in which the litigated damage clause
seemed reasonable, yet the court still voided the clause.67 In another
case, the court of appeals for Franklin County invalidated a liquidated
damage clause because the amount of damages which could have poten-
tially been forfeited was unreasonable.68 It is apparent that Ohio courts
are able to exercise a high degree of discretion with liquidated damage
clauses. As a result, the certainty of having these provisions enforced is
relatively low.
V. STRATEGIC PLANNING-A COMPARISON AMONG ARBITRATION,
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS, AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
The conflicting parties must examine each method before deciding
upon which method of dispute resolution to use. There are unique advan-
tages and risks associated with each method. This section will compare
the respective assets and liabilities of arbitration, settlement agreements,
and liquidated damages.
Although agreements to submit conflicts to dispute resolution are
structured differently, they have a great deal in common. First, all of the
methods are based upon contractual agreements. Liquidated damage
agreements are clauses within a larger contractual setting.69 Binding ar-
bitration requires an agreement before any dispute can be arbitrated.
70
Settlement agreements, whether oral or written, are contracts .7 Finally,
65. See 15 0. JUR. 3D, supra note 24, § 17 at 532. See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2711.10.
66. Liquidated damage agreements will only be enforced if provisions of OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1302.92 are met.
67. Berlinger v. Suburban Apt. Mgmt. Co., 7 Ohio App. 3d 122, 454 N.E.2d 1367
(1982).
68. Welch v. K-Beck Furniture Mart, 3 Ohio App. 3d 171, 444 N.E.2d 48 (1981).
69. See generally 30 0. JuR. 3D, supra note 2, at § 128.
70. See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.01.
71. See generally 15 0. JUR. 3D, supra note 24, at § 3.
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provided the agreements are valid, a court will enforce the amount of
damages which have been awarded by the alternative means of dispute
resolution.7 1
These methods, however, differ in a number of ways. The first aspect
which differs is the timing of the agreement. Liquidated damages are
agreed to when the contract is formed.73 Settlement agreements, logi-
cally, cannot be negotiated until after a dispute has arisen.74 Agreements
for arbitration can be formulated either at the time the contract is cre-
ated, or after a dispute has occurred.7 5
The timing of the agreement is very important to a party who is seek-
ing to avoid litigation. Once a conflict has occurred and passions are
inflamed, the opposing parties may actually desire litigation. 6 Conse-
quently, a party that desires to avoid litigation from the outset of its
contractual relationship, may wish to use a liquidated damage clause or
to stipulate arbitration. Either of these methods would help to preclude
some of the irrational thinking that frequently occurs with conflicting
parties.77
Another difference between the various methods is the amount of con-
trol the parties have in determining the final award. Arbitration provides
the parties virtually no control. The parties can control the decision not
to litigate, but after the choice is made, they have little influence over
subsequent events. 78 The arbitrator, or panel of arbitrators, fully ex-
amine the dispute.79 The arbitrator then decides to make an award pur-
suant to statutory guidelines. 80
72. See 30 0. JUR. 3D, supra note 2, at § 145; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.01; 15 0.
JUR. 3D, supra note 24, at § 13.
73. 30 0. JUR. 3D, supra note 2, at § 127.
74. 15 O. JUR. 3D, supra note 24, at § 3.
75. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.01.
76. J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 1, at 8-9. See also F. KNEBEL & G. CLAY,
BEFORE YOU SUE 13-15 (1987).
77. J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 1, at 8-9.
78. Assuming that the businesspeople submit their dispute to the American Arbitration
Association, the parties do have some say in choosing the arbitrator. Each side is presented
with a list of people who are experienced in the business of the conflicting parties. The
conflicting parties are able to strike unacceptable names and to list their desired choices of
both, and no person whose name was stricken will be appointed. See R. COULSON, HOW TO
STAY OUT OF COURT 143 (1984). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.04 for statutory
guidelines concerning the appointment of an arbitrator.
Some scholars argue that since legal procedural rules do not apply to arbitration, busi-
nesspeople feel in control of the situation. See R. CouLsoN, supra note 78, at 143. How-
ever, after the arbitrator is chosen, the respective parties do not really control the settle-
ment process. Certainly, as compared to settlement negotiation or liquidated damage
agreement negotiation, they exercise much less control over the ultimate award.
79. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.06; R. COULSON, supra note 79, at 143-44.
80. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.08.
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Alternatively, settlement agreements and liquidated damage agree-
ments provide a great deal of control. The parties are able to directly
negotiate their position. The resulting agreement, or decision to litigate,
is a product of each side's negotiating skill and strength.8 ' The limitation
of these methods, obviously, is that the opposition has a similar level of
control. Thus, unless one side is on a clearly advantageous bargaining
position or both parties are amenable to negotiation, a stalemate can oc-
cur. This presents a significantly different situation from the case of arbi-
tration in which a settlement award is guaranteed. 2 In spite of their
potential problems, parties favoring control of negotiations will probably
be more inclined to choose liquidated damage or settlement agreements
over arbitration.
The final area of contrast among the various methods is certainty of
enforcement. Arbitration awards and settlement agreements are much
more likely to be enforced by courts than liquidated damage clauses. The
reason for this difference is the narrow set of circumstances under which
liquidated damage clauses will be enforced compared to the other two
methods. 3
The differences that exist between the methods is critical because par-
ties who enter into dispute resolution want to be certain that the other
side will be required to perform under the agreement. If there is doubt as
to whether the agreement will be enforced, the parties may decide to
litigate. Consequently, those parties who wish to avoid litigation and
have any agreement enforced, would choose arbitration or settlement
agreements.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Liquidated damage agreements, as this Article has explained, are not
very effective as a means for dispute resolution in Ohio. They present a
number of practical problems and violate public policy concerning dis-
pute resolution. Several recommendations for improving existing law will
now be presented. While some suggestions may appear radical, they
81. See generally 30 0. JuR. 3D, supra note 2, at § 127; 15 0. JUR. 3D, supra note 24, at
§ 3.
82. Obviously negotiations for a settlement or liquidated damage agreement could break
down. In the former case, litigation would probably result; in the latter case, the negotia-
tion process might start again in case of a dispute. In the case of arbitration, some type of
final award will be made. See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.08.
83. See, e.g., 15 0. JUR. 3D, supra note 24, at § 17; OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.92;
30 0. JuR. 3D, supra note 2, at § 128.
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should be judged in light of the policy supports for dispute resolution
which this paper has identified.
First, liquidated damage agreements between employers and employ-
ees should be invalidated. The employer is usually in a superior bargain-
ing position compared to the employee. Consequently, it is relatively easy
for an employer to force such an agreement on an employee. Although
courts will not enforce unconscionable liquidated damage clauses, a stat-
utory provision concerning employer/employee agreements would be
beneficial for several reasons. Undoubtedly, many unconscionable liqui-
dated agreements are not litigated because the employee is ignorant of
the law and assumes he has no recourse. The proposed statute would
provide greater protection and notice to the employee. Additionally, the
statute would benefit the entire dispute resolution movement. Although
most methods of dispute resolution provide awards similar to those of
valid liquidated damage clauses, they do not contain the same psycholog-
ical implication of unfairness. As a result, the statute would indicate to
many individuals the inherent fairness of the dispute resolution process.
Some may argue that this recommendation does not go far enough.
They may argue that the legislature should specifically invalidate every
situation in which an inequitable bargaining position exists. Such an ex-
treme course is not recommended. The current law covers such problem
areass and, in fact, Ohio's judiciary has done a credible job of screening
liquidated damage agreements for evidence of inequitable bargaining po-
sitions.85 Only in employer/employee situations has its vigilance been
somewhat lax."' It is because of the distinct discrepancy in bargaining
power between employers and employees, as well as the courts' lack of
sensitivity to this situation, that it is specifically recommended that em-
ployer/employee liquidated damage agreements be prohibited.
A second recommendation is that the commission of a tort should in-
validate any liquidated damage agreement. There are two specific rea-
sons which support this recommendation. First, the result under current
law may render an injustice.87 In the previous hypothetical situation,
Joker Laundry, the party who induced the breach between Royal Apart-
ments and King Laundry, was not liable for any damage due to the va-
lidity of a liquidated damage agreement. Thus, King Laundry, the in-
84. Ohio courts must examine the intent of the parties in agreeing to liquidated damage
agreements in order to determine whether an injustice has occurred. See 30 0. JUR. 3D,
supra note 2, at § 132-36.
85. Id.
86. See. e.g., Lange v. Werk, 2 Ohio St. 519 (1853); Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio
St. 2d 21, 325 N.E.2d 544 (1975).
87. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Morse Signal Devices, 151 Cal. App. 3d 681,
198 Cal. Rptr. 756 (1984).
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jured party, could not seek any redress against Joker Laundry. King
Laundry's lack of a course of action highlights the second reason why
the commission of a tort should invalidate a liquidated damage agree-
ment. The existence of a cause of action would serve as a deterrent to
potential tortfeasors. Because there is currently no threat, tortfeasors are
able to act with impunity.
A third recommendation is that parties be allowed to stipulate dam-
ages regardless of certainty of their amount. Businesspeople desire to use
liquidated damage clauses for a number of reasons. They help preclude
the possibility of litigation. Furthermore, liquidated damage clauses have
the desirable aspects of timing (they are agreed to prior to any conflict)
and control (the individual party has the opportunity to negotiate the
award himself). Eliminating the requirement of "uncertain damages"8 8
would allow liquidated damage agreements to be used in many more sit-
uations and would also increase the certainty of their enforcement by the
courts because there would be fewer grounds for invalidating the agree-
ments. This revision would also support our society's general policy to
allow parties to contract their own settlement agreements. 9
The acceptance of this proposal, while generally beneficial, would also
carry some liabilities. Courts would need to maintain a high level of
scrutiny of these agreements because abuse would be much more likely."
If any award can be negotiated, one party might force an inequitable
award on the other party. As a result, courts would be required to ex-
amine "intent" very closely. Even under such a revised statute, however,
courts could still invalidate the agreement on grounds of
unconscionability. 9
Finally, the legislature should enact a statute which requires the refer-
ral of all conflicts involving invalidated liquidated damage agreements to
arbitration, not litigation.92 This statute should be enacted because it is
more consistent with the original aims of the contracting parties. At the
time of the contract formation, a primary motivation for the adoption of
88. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.92.
89. See, e.g., 15 0. JuR. 3D, supra note 24, at § 12.
90. In the case of unequal bargaining positions, for example, it might be possible for the
more powerful party to stipulate an exorbitant amount as liquidated damages.
91. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1302.92(A), for example, invalidates any "unreasonably
large liquidated damages." It is intended by the author that this type of provision remain
in the recommended statute.
92. The author, of course, intends that this provision not apply to employment contracts.
Because the first recommendation was that liquidated damage agreements between employ-
ers and employees be invalidated, the author assumes that the final recommendation will
not be applicable to employment contracts. This is not to say that employers and employees
should be prohibited from settling their conflicts short of litigation. Rather, the employee
should not be required, as a condition of employment, to waive his/her rights.
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a liquidated damage clause is the desire of the parties to avoid litigation.
Currently, if a liquidated damage agreement is invalidated, there is no
automatic referral to another method of dispute resolution. The parties
must either negotiate and reach a settlement or litigate. The proposed
arbitration, therefore, would better serve the original intent of the
parties.
This recommended legislation would also better serve public policy
goals. The judicial system is inundated with civil litigation. This arbitra-
tion proposal would reduce the amount of litigation because it would pro-
vide a different conduit for resolving disputes. Furthermore, this proposal
would not hinder policy concerns about the individual right to litigate
since, as explained previously, this change is more consistent with the
original intention of the parties. While the present law does not contain
any such provision, contracting parties may be able to achieve the same
effect if they included such a clause in their original contract. Ohio's
judiciary has not previously examined this type of situation. A Texas
court, however, decided a similar situation that serves to illustrate this
point.
The case of Ferguson v. Ferguson93 involved a dispute concerning a
decedent's estate. The parties to this action agreed to submit all disputes
involving the estate to arbitration. Furthermore, the parties included a
liquidated damage clause into their agreement. The clause stated that
any party that failed to abide by the arbiter's decision would forfeit
twenty-five thousand dollars to the other party. When one party
breached the agreement, the other party went to court in order to en-
force the liquidated damage clause. 4
The court of appeals began its analysis by determining that the
amount of liquidated damages was not unconscionable. The court based
this determination on the size of the estate and potential legal expenses
that could be incurred in the litigation or settlement.95 The court then
stated that the respective parties were fully aware of their actions when
they entered into their agreement.96 The court also believed that the de-
cision to arbitrate was not against public policy. 7
The court then examined the issue of whether the parties could con-
tractually waive their right of appeal. The court found such agreements
valid under Texas law.9" Therefore, the use of a liquidated damage
93. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 110 S.W.2d 1016 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
94. Id. at 1017-18.
95. Id. at 1019.
96. Id. at 1020.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1021.
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clause to enforce an arbitration agreement was valid." In reaching this
decision, the court stated:
[i]t seems to us that if agreements to arbitrate are . . favored by the
Constitution and laws of our state, certainly a collateral agreement in the
nature of a covenant (defining in advance the remedies of the parties in case
one of them refuses to abide [by] the results of the arbitration thereby
preventing the arbitration from having its contemplated effect) could not be
said to contravene public policy.100
Applying the foregoing reasoning, it seems reasonable to conclude that
any agreement to refer an invalidated liquidated damage clause to arbi-
tration would be upheld. Additionally, the Ferguson case provides a
sound policy argument for the codification of this practice.
VII. CONCLUSION
While discussing the merits of civil litigation, Abraham Lincoln once
said, "Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise
whenever you can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a
real loser-in fees, expenses and waste of time." '01 Those words are even
more applicable today than when they were first spoken. The current
litigation explosion wastes the courts' and litigants' valuable resources.
Because of these problems, dispute resolution is increasingly being sug-
gested as an alternative to litigation. This Article has examined the mer-
its of liquidated damage agreements as a method of dispute resolution.
It was determined that liquidated damages are not very effective. They
can be upheld in only a very narrow set of circumstances. Consequently,
courts have a great deal of latitude in evaluating these agreements. They
are frequently invalidated even when they appear reasonable. By con-
trast, the enforcement of certain liquidated damage agreements can work
an injustice. This injustice may affect either the non-breaching party,
such as a tort victim, or the breaching party, such as an employee.
As a result of the problems associated with liquidated damage agree-
ments, an examination of society's basic goals for dispute resolution was
then conducted and a comparison made to existing liquidated damage
laws. Not surprisingly, several discrepancies were identified. Strategies
for coping with these problems, including the use of other methods of
dispute resolution, were then presented. Finally, a series of recommenda-
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1022.
101. J. HENRY & J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 1.
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tions for improving the current state of liquidated damage law were
made.
In this era of voluminous litigation, it is critical that parties be able to
resolve disputes of their own accord. It is also important that those meth-
ods be effective and fair. Liquidated damages can play an important role
in resolving disputes and preventing litigation. The framework provided
can, hopefully, make liquidated damage agreements a better alternative
than the "sickness and death"1 2 mentioned by Judge Hand.
John Sheppard
102. Id.

